Neil Campbell has been with the Philosophy Department at Wilfrid Laurier University since 2000. Before his appointment he was an Instructor at the University of Calgary.

(See my biography page for more information).


Publications:
Explanatory Pluralism

I explore a way to support the claim that explaining actions by identifying reasons for acting is not to offer a causal explanation.

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Article: Electronic

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Zombies and the Conceivability Illusion

I critically explore Daniel Dennett's claim that those who think zombies are possible have fallen prey to a kind of illusion of the imagination.

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On the Social Status of Reasons

I critically evaluate an argument that the social nature of reasons entails that explanations appealing to reasons cannot be causal explanations.

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Explanatory Exclusion and the Status of Special Scientific Explanations

My aim is to undermine Jaegwon Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion by attacking his assumptions about the epistemology of explaining.

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Nonreductive Physicalism and the Supervenience/Exclusion Argument

I argue that Davidson's anomalous monism escapes Jaegwon Kim's supervenience/exclusion argument.

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Kim’s New Reductionism

I argue that Kim's version of reductionism does not fare any better than versions of nonreductive physicalism at securing mental causation.

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The Generalization Argument, Multiple Realization, and Special Science Properties

I critically explore Jaegwon Kim's attempt to block the claim that his supervenience/exclusion argument generalizes, thereby threatening the causal and explanatory legitimacy of special science properties.

Article: Print

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Are (Some) Qualophiles Contradicting Themselves?

I explore three qualia-based objections to physicalism and argue that they each involve contradictory assumptions about the causal efficacy of qualia.

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The Failure of the Frankfurt Style Counterexample

I argue that Frankfurt style examples fail as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities on the grounds that they do not individuate actions finely enough.

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